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A B S T R A C T   
In an editorial for this journal a decade ago, then-Editor-in-Chief Fred Phillips asserted that social change was 
proceeding at hyper-speed and, moreover, that it had consequently come to outpace technological change. This 
paper submits these claims to empirical assay. In so doing, we address the myriad problems attendant upon 
determining and interpreting the sort of data that might support us in our cause. Notwithstanding the innu-
merable caveats that this necessarily entails, and restricting ourselves to considering US data, we conclude that a 
wide range of indicators suggest that millennial Americans are not living in a time of particularly rapid social 
change, at least not when compared to the period 1900–1950. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that the data 
that we have considered does not easily support a contention that significant variation in social change occurs in 
long wave-like cycles. The evidence is more supportive of a punctuated equilibrium model of change.   
1. Introduction 
A vibrant (albeit contentious) research stream postulates that tech-
nological change is stagnating or at least has been slowing down in 
recent decades. That question is not our primary concern here, although 
we do on occasion touch on it out of contextual necessity. Rather, we are 
interested in the rate of social change and whether or not this is speeding 
up or slowing down. A string of best-selling books with titles such as 
Future Shock (Toffler, 1970), Thriving on Chaos (Peters, 1989), Faster 
(Gleick, 1999), Business @ the Speed of Thought (Gates, 2000), The Sin-
gularity is Near (Kurzweil, 2005), and The Great Acceleration (Colvile, 
2017) would suggest that we do, in fact, live in a period of rapid social 
change. However, these books tend to gloss over a host of epistemo-
logical and methodological issues, not least of which is a fairly insistent 
technological determinism occluding rather than illuminating ‘social’ 
change, that would need to be addressed if this assertion is to be 
convincing. We discuss these issues in the first part of the paper. The 
issues are complex and perhaps intractable but, on their own, they 
should not preclude us from at least collecting and analyzing some 
longitudinal data that reflects, in some way, social change. Hence, in the 
second part of the paper we present a broad range of data that, at least 
partly, gives some indication of how the rate of social change in the 
United States has varied over the last century. From the data presented, 
our tentative conclusion is that the rate of social change appears to be 
lower in the period 1970–2020 than 1920–1970. Our analysis does not 
support the notion that significant variation in social change occurs in 
roughly fifty-year Kondratieff wave-like cycles. Instead, the evidence is 
more supportive of a punctuated equilibrium model of change. 
2. Is technological change stagnating? 
Notwithstanding much popular talk highlighting the ‘fact’ that we 
live in a period of tremendous and accelerating technological change, a 
more somber research stream suggests that technological change is 
actually stagnating. One example is Huebner’s article (2005a), A possible 
declining trend for worldwide innovation, in which he concluded, based on 
an analysis of 7198 innovation events, that ‘the rate of innovation 
peaked in the year 1873 and is now rapidly declining’. 
Not surprisingly, Heubner’s paper was promptly criticized by Smart 
(2005), Modis (2005) and Coates (2005). Their critiques argued, inter 
alia, that it is practically impossible to objectively measure this sort of 
change, or indeed innovation or growth, while Heubner fundamentally 
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distorted the picture by adjusting for population size. The criticisms are 
not without merit – though see Heubner’s (2005b; 2006) rebuttal and 
Coates’s (2006) subsequent response – but we will refrain from engaging 
in the detail of the debate, save to point out that their argument is but 
one skirmish in a wider discussion where others have suggested that 
innovation, contrary to popular perception, is actually slowing down. 
In 1925 the Soviet economist Nikolai Kondratieff hypothesized the 
existence of long waves, each lasting roughly fifty years, with alter-
nating intervals of high and low economic growth. The Austrian political 
economist, Joseph Schumpeter, elaborated on the idea of long waves – 
which he said should be named ‘Kondratieff waves’ – focusing attention 
on the role of innovation in generating the cycles that Kondratieff had 
observed. Schumpeter was a friend of Peter Drucker’s father and a 
frequent visitor to the young Drucker’s Vienna home, and so it is un-
surprising that the notion of long waves is evident in Drucker’s writing 
about technological change. For instance in The Age of Discontinuity, he 
observed that ‘the fifty years that came to an end with World War I 
produced most of the inventions that underlie our modern industrial 
civilization’ and that, in contrast, the period from 1918 to 1968 was one 
of ‘relative stability in technologies and industries’ (Drucker, 1969: 7). 
Ten years later, Mensch (1979) was saying something similar, 
arguing that basic innovations appear in clumps throughout history, 
emerging particularly during economic depressions and producing 
economic upswings a decade and a half later. Outside of these periodic 
bursts in basic innovations, there are long periods where technology has 
essentially stagnated with only pseudo innovations being developed 
(Haustein and Maier, 1980). This is in line with Schumpeter’s evolu-
tionary process of ‘creative destruction’ which involves a coming into 
existence, growth, decline, and elimination, and a constant interplay 
between stagnation and innovation, deadlock and process, and crisis and 
revival. For Mensch, the historical evidence suggests that the mid-1970s 
was a lull period, what he referred to as a ‘stalemate in technology’. 
Metz (2006) provided more empirical support for the notion that growth 
cycles between periods of acceleration and deceleration, with ‘the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century … marked by a slowdown in growth 
rates’. This also accords with Gordon’s (2000a; 2016) research which 
identified slow productivity growth in the late 19th century, then an 
accelerating growth, peaking in 1928–50, and then a deceleration to a 
slow rate after 1972 (though this is more a case of ‘one big wave’ rather 
than multiple fifty-year waves). 
Others economists have come to similar conclusions, and a minor 
literature has developed around the idea that we are now living through 
a period of secular (or long-term) stagnation with low levels of economic 
growth, inflation, interest rates, productivity gains and overall income 
growth, while savings, asset prices and inequality increase significantly 
(Magdoff and Sweezy, 1987; Cowen, 2011; Teulings and Baldwin, 2014; 
Eichengreen, 2015; Gordon, 2015; Summers, 2015). More broadly, the 
reality of climate change has re-focused attention on the impossibility of 
endless exponential growth and the consequent need to envision and 
implement a post-growth or de-growth economy (Douthwaite, 1992; 
Latouche, 2009; Heinberg, 2011; Trainer, 2012; Jackson, 2019; Pansera 
and Fressoli, 2020). 
3. From technological to social change 
The perception that the economy is stagnating, that technology has 
stalemated, and that we now have relatively few basic innovations, 
tends to focus on technological rather than social change. The latter is of 
more interest to us. The distinction between the technological and the 
social is commonly made – see this journal’s title – and routinely un-
derpins theoretical and empirical contributions. For instance, Drucker 
observed that although society was radically altered during the period 
following the Victorian era, the core technologies on which our economy 
relies were not: 
The world of the ‘New Left’ and of the ‘Hippies’, of ‘Op Art’ and of 
Mao Tse Tung’s ‘Cultural Revolution’, of H-bombs and moon rockets, 
seems further removed from the certainties and perceptions of the Vic-
torians and Edwardians than they were from the Age of the Migration at 
the end of antiquity. But in the economy, in industrial geography, in-
dustrial structure, and industrial technology, we are still very much the 
heirs of the Victorians. (Drucker, 1969: 8) 
The distinction between the technological and the social is also 
fundamental to Ogburn’s (1922) classic study of social change, though 
he used the terms ‘material’ and ‘non-material’ culture instead of tech-
nological and social. Phillips and Linstone (2016: 164) suggest that ‘The 
meaningful question… is whether technology changes faster than cul-
ture.’ For Ogburn, material culture gives ‘particular emphasis to the 
material features of culture. The word, culture, properly includes, as 
does the term, social heritage, both the material culture and such parts 
of culture as knowledge, belief, morals, law, and custom’ (p. 4). Ogburn 
hypothesized that the various parts of modern culture do not change at 
the same rate and that some elements of culture are more likely to take 
the lead in initiating cultural change. His thesis has more than a whiff of 
technological determinism (1922: 76–77; 1938: 2; Ogburn and Nimkoff, 
1940: 809–810), though he opined that some parts of the non-material 
culture were more adaptive to change in the material culture than 
others: 
The adaptive culture is therefore that portion of the non-material 
culture which is adjusted or adapted to the material conditions. Some 
parts of the non-material culture are thoroughly adaptive culture, such 
as certain rules involved in handling technical appliances, and some 
parts are only indirectly or partially so, as for instance, religion … The 
family, therefore, under the terminology used here is a part of the non- 
material culture that is only partly adaptive. (1922: 203). 
This echoes Braudel’s (1972/1996) distinction between the longue 
durée, which focuses on the longstanding and imperceptibly slowly 
changing relationships between people and their environment, the 
moyenne durée of economic and social trends, and the courte durée which 
is concerned with named individuals, events and politics. 
Hence, there will be a ‘cultural lag’ between a change in the material 
culture (a technological invention) and differential changes in the non- 
material (social) culture (Ogburn, 1922: 200–283). At the same time, 
Ogburn recognized that social inventions, especially those of the 
behavioral and social sciences, can be important causes of change as 
well as key elements in a society’s ability to adapt to change and reduce 
cultural lags. 
Once we distinguish between the technological and the social, we are 
almost necessarily locked into hypothesizing that a change in one will 
cause a change in the other. Moreover, the presumed causality is typi-
cally from the technological to the social, as when we refer to the ‘stone’, 
‘iron’, ‘steam’ and ‘computer’ ages and when we associate epochs and 
nations with a single technological artefact. The distinction also un-
derpins the difference between the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ sciences, with the 
former evoking the hardness of the material, technological world of 
artefacts and the latter evoking the softness of human flesh and flexi-
bility. But the distinction is also routinely seen as problematic, because 
the technological and the social are mutually embedded in one another, 
because they are difficult to distinguish operationally, and because 
doing so is liable to lead to some form of (technological) determinism. 
Phillips seeks to deal with this issue through the notion of a ‘circle of 
innovation’ (Phillips, 2016; see also, Phillips, forthcoming). 
To counter these issues, the idea of ‘socio-technical systems’, popu-
larized by people like Emery and Trist, focused attention on the inter-
action between people and technology, even if the latter was more 
centered on the technical aspects of organizing rather than material 
technologies (Trist, 1978). Others, such as the actor-network theorists, 
have argued that the notion of the socio-technical is misleading, as there 
is no such thing as the purely social or the purely technical. Instead, the 
human and the non-human must be treated symmetrically. For the 
actor-network theorists, this means that the distinction between the 
social and the technical, and how the distinction came to be, is the thing 
to be explained, the explanandum, rather than an a priori and assumed 
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part of any explanation, the ad explanans (Shapiro, 1997). Hence, con-
cepts like ‘actants’ take the place of humans and non-humans. More 
recently, we see a similar move in the literature on sociomateriality 
(Orlikowski and Scott, 2008) and in concepts like intra-action (Barad, 
2003). But, while these positions are philosophically robust, the 
social-technological distinction is virtually impossible to avoid, much 
less obliterate, and it is difficult to see how the actor-network theorists 
could write anything comprehensible if they treated the human and 
non-human as truly symmetrical. 
This brief review suggests that while the social and the technological 
are deeply implicated in one another, it still makes sense to (a) keep the 
distinction between the two, and (b) develop an understanding of what 
social change might mean and how it might be measured. It is to the 
latter that we now turn, in line with Fred Phillips’ assertion that a 
‘journal with a title like Technological Forecasting & Social Change should, 
however, invite research on measuring the rate of social change’ (Phil-
lips, 2011:1077). 
4. Measuring the rate of social change 
One way of measuring the rate of social change is to record the 
number of social innovations over time, similar to Huebner’s (2005a) 
chronological analysis of important technological developments. How-
ever, such a project would be impractical. Not only would it be subject to 
the same criticisms as Huebner’s study, but there is also no ready dataset 
of social innovations and indeed it is difficult to see how such a dataset 
might be meaningfully constructed. What, for instance, might constitute 
a ‘social innovation’? Drucker (1987) identifies five social innovations 
(the research lab; Eurodollar and commercial paper; mass movements; 
the farm agent; and management practices) but his point is not that there 
are more social innovations now than in the past – for him, the 19th 
century was ‘a period of very great social innovation’ (p. 34) – but that 
such innovations were now being initiated by actors other than gov-
ernments and were now properly the domain of ‘management’. Ogburn 
and Gilfillan (1933:163) identified 50 social inventions, but their 
eclectic list only highlights the impossibility of measuring the rate of 
change in social inventions or innovations over time (their list includes 
Armistice day, Basketball, Chain store, Day nursery, Esperanto, Federal 
Reserve system, Group insurance, Holding company, Indeterminate 
sentence, Junior college, Ku Klux Klan, League of Nations, Matrimonial 
bureau, National economic council, One-step, Passport, Recall, Seminar, 
Tag day, Universal suffrage, and Visiting Teacher). Hence, one has to 
conclude that, while social inventions/innovations are certainly worthy 
of study (Cajaiba-Santana, 2014; Edwards-Schachter and Wallace, 
2017), they are not the most promising basis for measuring the rate of 
social change. 
This suggests that any attempt at measuring social change is liable to 
end up in a similar cul-de-sac. We can, presumably, but not without 
difficulty, measure social indicators, and we can also track how these 
indicators change over time (again not without difficulty), but we 
cannot avoid the fact that these indicators are qualitatively incom-
mensurable, are irreducible to a common quantitative denominator, and 
consequently cannot be aggregated to deduce the level of social change. 
We can no more add the divorce rate to life expectancy than we can add 
apples and oranges. 
Moreover, even though we may be able to measure a social trend, 
such as the divorce rate, it is difficult to see how such a quantitative 
measure can shed light on the more qualitative aspects of the human 
condition. Numbers can hardly reveal the kind, content, style, form or 
values of the arts, while beliefs, tastes, mores, convictions, ideologies 
and philosophical systems are all likely to get glossed over in any 
attempt at quantification. In short, the inner aspects of culture are 
arguably irreducible to numbers and hence beyond the social scientist’s 
quantitative toolkit. 
In the face of these difficulties, what are we to make of claims, for 
instance, that we now live in a time of rapid social change? Is it sufficient 
to say that the concept of ‘social change’ is epistemologically incoherent 
and methodologically problematic? Furthermore, if we cannot measure 
social change, then how can we adjudicate on the relative merits of 
different models of social change, such as the transformation models 
that focus on the transition from traditional to modern forms of social 
organization (Tonnies, Durkheim), linear decline models (Spengler), 
cyclical models (Pareto, Sorokin), diffusion models (Rogers) or radical 
models of social change (Marx)? Similarly, how can one assess the merit 
of a theory like technological determinism if its core constructs (tech-
nological change and social change) cannot be meaningfully measured. 
(This may explain why the theory persists.) And what about scholarly 
journals that have ‘social change’ in their title, such as this one and 
eleven others? 
These difficulties may be why the concept of social change has 
remained largely unexamined in this journal. For instance, the concept is 
noticeably absent in Singh et al. (2020) recent bibliometric study of the 
4248 articles published in TF&SC between 1970 and 2018. They 
analyzed the articles using five basic keywords – ‘technology, energy, 
climate, resources, and innovation’ – none of which is clearly associated 
with social change. Their visual representation of the relative frequency 
of author keywords also shows that ‘social change’ has one of the lowest 
counts of some 87 keywords. Further, articles from the journal do not 
feature in wider scholarly conversations about social change: a ProQuest 
search of full text scholarly articles with ‘social change’ in the publica-
tion title or document title yielded 3383 journal articles, but only 3 of 
these cited articles in TF&SC. 
The dilemma is clearly set out in Fred Phillips’ (2011) editorial 
where he highlights the ‘difficulty of measuring the rate of social change 
… stemming from complexity, from measuring the wrong things, from 
pressures to shade the reporting of measures, and from political and 
infrastructural breakdowns that disrupt the measurement process’ (p. 
1077). Notwithstanding these difficulties, he opines that social change 
‘proceeds at hyper-speed’ and ‘is now the hare and tech change the 
tortoise, relatively speaking’ (p. 1073). Cajaiba-Santana (2014: 42) goes 
even further, noting ‘the fact that social change has overtaken the speed 
of technological innovation’ (emphasis added). This is a hypothesis 
worth inquiring into, but our focus is on the more basic question of how 
social change might be measured and whether or not we live in a period 
of rapid social change. Comparing the speed of social and technological 
change is not our concern here. 
How to measure social change is something that has occupied social 
theorists for a long time, at least as far back as the 1920s when Ogburn 
(1922) published Social change with respect to cultural and original nature 
and when the Lynds studied how the white population of a typical 
American city had changed between 1885 and 1925 (Lynd and Lynd, 
1929). However, measuring social change was only of marginal interest 
in the social sciences until the social indicators movement emerged in 
the late 1960s, sparked by Bauer’s (1966) edited collection and Sheldon 
and Moore’s (1968) Indicators of Social Change. The movement was 
bolstered in 1974 when the journal Social Indicators Research was 
launched, while in 1972 the National Opinion Research Center con-
ducted its first General Social Survey of American attitudes on issues 
such as crime and punishment, confidence in institutions, national 
spending priorities, and intergroup relations. It was also around this 
time, specifically 1970, when this journal’s title was amended to include 
“& Social Change”. 
Not surprisingly, this focus on social indicators led to a renewed 
interest in how and why these indicators had changed over time. In the 
main, studies of such social trends were limited to domains readily 
amenable to quantification, such as economic development, voting, and 
population (Caplow, 2002). At best, these trends provide only a limited 
understanding of the rate of social change, which is our particular 
concern. A more robust inquiry into the rate of social change should also 
examine trends in families, religion, consumption, leisure, health, edu-
cation, social stratification, welfare, etc. and study how qualitative el-
ements – such as beliefs, mores and values – have changed over time. 
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The complexity of the issue is compounded when we consider further 
methodological problems. For instance, since social reality is complex, 
respondents are likely to find a researcher’s measures, terms and ques-
tions ambiguous, irrelevant or misleading (Einola and Alvesson, 2020). 
Another important consideration is that measuring social life depends 
on a socially organized way of knowing, which is itself subject to change. 
What a society wants or allows to be measured and how the measuring 
will be funded and executed, are all socially determined and may 
themselves change over time. Moreover, societies are reflexive phe-
nomena in that individuals use the knowledge and insights gained from 
social science to change and interpret their own practices and beliefs. As 
Giddens (1984: 20) puts it, ‘the “findings” of the social sciences very 
often enter constitutively into the world they describe’. At a more micro 
level, the understanding of a concept, how a concept is operationalized 
empirically, how ‘data’ is collected, analyzed and disseminated, are all 
vulnerable to change (Smith, 2020). For instance, the notion of a ‘crime 
rate’ is dependent on an organized effort to conceptualize, detect and 
measure crime, which problematizes any attempt to speak of the ‘true’ 
or ‘real’ rate of crime (Reiss, 1986). 
In addition, there is a tendency to develop and use instruments that 
gather information from and about individuals rather than collective 
entities, organizations and populations of organizations, each of which 
might be both a cause and effect of social change. Similarly, concepts 
and measures more often refer to individual statuses rather than orga-
nizational positions. Added to the mix are the plethora of methodolog-
ical issues that social scientists must routinely address in any empirical 
study. How can causes and effects be distinguished? How should the lag 
between an event, our measurement, interpretation, and analysis be 
dealt with? With what frequency should we collect data? How do we 
attend to post-hoc rationalization, willful misrepresentation, biases, 
fallacious reasoning, category errors, and the like? 
The difficulties seem insuperable and one would be tempted to 
abandon any endeavor at measuring the rate of social change. However, 
to do so seems inappropriate, not least because the concept of social 
change is commonplace, common-sensical and basic to a range of social 
theories and understandings of the world. Hence our approach is to 
proceed with a mix of humility, caution, optimism, skepticism and 
pragmatism. Methodological difficulties are unavoidable and so the best 
we can do is collect and analyze as much data as we can, focusing on 
data that might provide a perspective on the rate of social change, all the 
time anchoring our inquiry around the question of whether or not we are 
living in a period of (relatively) rapid change. 
In order to maximize our chances of saying something meaningful in 
the midst of the morass of potential measures, and the potential pitfalls 
associated with them, we have adopted three methodological principles. 
First, we have focused on US data only, because the US has been the 
trailblazer and leading world economy and because data is readily 
available, although an obvious downside of this choice is a necessarily 
restricted ability to examine the changing status of that country (and of 
course of other countries and regions) in the global economy. Second, 
we have focused on a relatively lengthy sway of time. Where possible, 
we compare data and trends from c. 1900 to 2020, choosing 1970 as our 
most frequent point of distinction, which is when Drucker enlivened the 
debate with his first major contribution to it. It is also of course the point 
of inauguration of this journal. Third, we have collected a wide range of 
data, drawing on various dimensions and probable causes of ‘change’. Of 
necessity, given our interest in the rate of social change, we have 
collected and analyzed quantitative data, though we also draw on 
studies that have analyzed qualitative data, such as diaries, newspaper 
reports, letters and the like. In particular, the Middletown studies have 
been an important source. This research project began in 1924 when 
Robert and Helen Lynd conducted an in-depth, mixed-methods study of 
how the lives of the white residents of Muncie, Indiana – which they 
chose as representative of normal American life – had changed since 
1885. They called the town Middletown and published their results in 
1929 in a book that considered social change across six categories: 
working, home and family, youth and learning, leisure time, religion, 
government and community (Lynd and Lynd, 1929). Ten years later they 
returned to Muncie and that study led to another book, Middletown in 
Transition (Lynd and Lynd, 1937). During the 1970s, another team of 
sociologists, led by Caplow, Bahr and Chadwick, replicated and 
expanded on the original studies in a project they labelled Middletown 
III, which yielded two further books and numerous articles (Caplow, 
1982; Caplow et al., 1983). Caplow and Bahr returned in the late 1990s, 
producing further publications on what they called Middletown IV 
(Caplow et al., 2001, 2004). While the studies can be criticized – for 
instance, the Lynns only studied white residents and they avoided some 
important issues, such as differences between urban and rural commu-
nities and intra-country migration – they are a unique and rich longi-
tudinal study of social change in America. 
Another way of addressing some of the methodological issues out-
lined above is to consider change as primarily a subjective phenomenon, 
drawing out the impact on the surface of our lives of what may be 
shifting beneath. For example, one could repurpose an object such as the 
Stress Scale developed by Holmes and Rahe (1967), which scores 
different life events in terms of the stress each event is likely to cause 
individuals, measured in ‘life change units’. An event that changes one’s 
life significantly seems an appropriate focus for any study of social 
change. The top eight ‘life events’ on Holmes and Rahe’s scale are: (i) 
death of a spouse; (ii) divorce; (iii) marital separation; (iv) imprison-
ment; (v) death of a close family member; (vi) personal injury or illness; 
(vii) marriage; and (viii) dismissal from work. This has also helped guide 
our data collection. 
5. Picturing social change 
Previous studies seeking to depict social change typically organize 
social indicators into categories. For instance, Sheldon and Moore 
(1968) organize their Indicators of Social Change into thirteen categories, 
the Lynds (1929) had six, while Caplow et al. (2001) The First Measured 
Century is divided into fifteen chapters. We are not concerned with 
technological change and so we have organized our data into seven 
categories: Population; Health; Home, Education & Leisure; Religion; 
Work; Wealth; Law & Order. 
5.1. Population 
The rate of change of population is one potential and common in-
dicator, since it is difficult to see how significant changes in population 
would not signal social change. Thus, Fig. 1 plots the annual change in 
US population and the rate of change of population since 1800. What 
that figure clearly shows is that while the US population has continued 
to increase inexorably over the last two centuries, more recently the rate 
of annual change in population has been progressively decreasing. Spe-
cifically, the standard deviation on the annual population change be-
tween 1901 and 1950 is over three times the standard deviation of the 
annual population change between 1951 and 2000. 
Fig. 2 shows how the ethnic composition of the US population has 
changed since 1900. Between 1900 and 1950, the distribution remained 
quite consistent at 90% white and 10% black. Since 1950 there has been 
an appreciable growth in the Asian, Hispanic and Other populations, and 
now just over 70% of the population is white. However, the change in 
ethnic composition over recent decades has merely continued a trend 
that has been in place since the mid-twentieth century. These incre-
mental changes will, perhaps, have tremendous repercussions in indi-
vidual communities as they become ‘white minority,’ but the overall 
trend has not changed radically. 
5.2. Health 
Fig. 3 shows much bigger changes in both death rate and life ex-
pectancy in the first half of the 20th century compared to the second, 
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and the rates have practically stabilized over the last decade or so. 
Deaths impact severely on the bereaved and thus signal stress inducing 
events that are likely associated with enhanced subjective experience of 
change. In particular, death of a spouse is the highest ranked ‘life event’ 
on Holmes and Rahe’s stress scale, while death of a close family member 
is ranked fifth. 
The death of a child is particularly traumatic. Fig. 4 shows that we 
have moved from a situation where the death of young children was 
commonplace, to one where it is now vanishingly rare. Maternal mor-
tality showed a similar rapid decline, dropping from 582 deaths per 
100,000 live births in 1935 to 40 in 1956 and 7.1 in 1998 (Guyer et al., 
2000). 
The annual number of people killed at work also declined consis-
tently throughout the twentieth century. For instance, employee fatal-
ities in the railroad industry dropped from 4534 in 1907 to 93 in 1997, 
while in the mining industry the number dropped from 3250 to just 32, 
with almost all of the decrease happening in the first half of the century 
(Caplow et al., 2001: 29) 
Personal injury or illness is the sixth highest life event on the stress 
scale, which suggests that illness is a good indicator of the turbulence 
Fig. 1. US population and Annual Percentage Change in Population.  
Fig. 2. Percent of US population by race.  
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one might expect to be associated with increased subjective experience 
of change. Fig. 5 shows that the more serious notifiable diseases (health 
conditions that must be reported to public health authorities) were 
relatively common in the first half of the twentieth century but, with the 
exception of gonorrhea, their prevalence subsequently decreased 
dramatically. Since 1970, these serious diseases rarely occur in the US, 
with the present generation enjoying an extended period of good health. 
The graphs do not include data on Covid-19, which, while it is a noti-
fiable disease, is not nearly as deadly as the diseases that were rampant 
in the first half of the twentieth century. For instance, in the late 19th 
century tuberculosis killed one out of every seven people living in the 
United States and Europe (https://www.cdc.gov/tb/worldtbday/histor 
y.htm) while smallpox killed more people than the Black Death and 
two World Wars combined but was declared eradicated in 1980. 
The spectacular improvement in health can be mainly attributed to a 
range of public health measures implemented in the last decades of the 
nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth when there were 
major initiatives on water treatment, food safety, organized waste 
disposal, and public education. Improvements in housing and decreased 
crowding in cities also reduced mortality from diseases caused by 
person-to-person airborne transmission. Medicine played a later but less 
important role, and its contribution was confined to what O’Mahony 
(2019) describes as medicine’s ‘golden age’ from the mid-1930s to the 
mid-1980s. According to the virologist and Nobel Laureate Sir Macfar-
lane Burnet, that age had ended even earlier, as he noted in 1971 that 
‘[a]lmost none of modern basic research in the medical sciences has any 
direct or indirect bearing on the prevention of disease or on the 
improvement of the medical care’(Burnet, 1971: 218). 
Fig. 3. Death rate and life expectancy.  
Fig. 4. Childhood death rates.  
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Suicide is a particularly disturbing life event and is presumably a 
surrogate measure of stress levels. Indeed for Durkheim (1897/1970), 
one of the founding fathers of modern sociology, it was a key indicator of 
the extent of ‘anomie’ members of a society were experiencing and thus 
an indirect measure of the health of the social body. And one can 
perhaps read ‘health’ in this context as a sign of society’s capacity to 
cope with change and thus a potential marker of the extent of the sub-
jective experience of the latter. The average suicide rate in the US 
dropped from 13.3 to 11.4 per 100,000 population between the first and 
second half of the twentieth century, but, perhaps more importantly, the 
standard deviation in the first half was 2.3 times the standard deviation 
in the second half, reflecting high peaks in suicide rates from 1910 to 
1920 and from 1933 to 1940 (see Fig. 6). The suicide rate has increased 
since around 2000 – although the increase is marginal when considered 
against historical rates – reflecting a general increase in mental health 
issues over that period (Dwyer-Lindgren et al., 2016; Mojtabai et al., 
2016). 
Notwithstanding the increase in mental health issues, the level of 
happiness of the US population has, as Fig. 7 shows, remained remark-
ably stable over the last 50 years. Overall, the health data presented in 
Figs. 3 to 7 show that the last half-century has been a period of relative 
stasis and rude good health compared, in particular, to the first half of 
the twentieth century. 
5.3. Home, education & leisure 
Divorce and marital separation rank second and third, after the death 
of a spouse, on the Holmes and Rahe stress scale, while marriage is 
Fig. 5. Prevalence of Notifiable Diseases.  
Fig. 6. Suicide Rate and Annual change in suicide rate.  
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ranked at seventh. Hence, one would expect an enhanced subjective 
experience of change when both marriage and divorce are taking place 
at a high rate. As Fig. 8 illustrates, what we seem to be seeing here over 
the moyenne durée is fewer marriages, as the product of more cohabiting 
and later tying of knots, leading to fewer divorces (Bumpass et al., 
1991). However, there appears to be no evidence that divorces (or 
marriages) have been rising in relative incidence over the last 50 years. 
The median age of marriage and the proportion ever marrying is now 
about the same as it was in the late 1800s, and in this context it is the 
high marriage rates of the 1950s that seem anomalous (Popenoe, 1993). 
Another anomaly is the ‘baby boom’ that occurred between 1946 and 
1964 when the fertility rate increased, having decreased consistently 
since the eighteenth century. However, as Fig. 8 shows, there has been 
no significant change in the fertility rate over the last forty years. 
One consistent trend, throughout the twentieth century, has been 
towards smaller household sizes, though again the significant changes 
were in the first half of the twentieth century rather than the second. 
Average household size decreased from 5.79 in 1790 to 4.99 in 1880 to 
2.76 in 1980. However, average household size has practically stabilized 
over the last four decades and has actually risen in recent years – from 
2.59 in 2010 to 2.63 in 2018 (Caplow et al., 2001: 93; Fry, 2019). 
Home ownership has also increased inexorably throughout the 
twentieth century, from 37% in 1900 to 66% in 1998. The number of 
mortgaged homes as a percentage of all owner-occupied homes showed 
a similar pattern, slowly but consistently increasing from 32% in 1900 to 
61% in 1997 (Caplow et al., 2001: 97). 
The Middletown studies reveal a consistent and steady increase in 
mother-child and father-child contact throughout the twentieth century, 
though recent decades are in no way exceptional (Caplow et al., 2001: 
89). The time prime-age women spend on ‘home production’ fell by 
around six hours from 1900 to 1965 and by another 12 h from 1965 to 
2005, while the time spent by prime-age men rose by 13 h from 1900 to 
Fig. 7. General happiness.  
Fig. 8. Divorce, marriage and fertility rates.  
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2005 (Ramey, 2009). 
Not only has the marriage rate declined consistently over the last 
fifty years, but people are also getting married later in life, which 
perhaps explains why Americans, over that period, have become more 
accepting of premarital sex and adolescent sex, but less accepting of 
extramarital sex (Caplow et al., 2001: 77; Twenge et al., 2015). 
Non-marital births have increased consistently since 1960 (Caplow 
et al., 2001: 87). 
Comparing data in the 1992 National Health and Social Life Survey 
(Laumann et al., 1994; Michael et al., 1995) with the Kinsey studies 
(Kinsey et al., 1948; 1953) indicates that extramarital sexual activity 
was much more common in the mid-twentieth century than in the 
1990s. This somewhat surprising result is probably because people, in 
the latter part of the century, could more easily leave unsatisfying 
marriages as divorce was more easily available. Acceptance of extra-
marital sex has remained consistently low, declining from 4% in 1973 to 
1% in 2012 (Twenge et al., 2015). In contrast, there has been a 
noticeable increase in acceptance of sexual activity between adults of 
the same sex: acceptance was in the low teens until around 1993 when it 
rose to 22% and subsequently increased steadily to 44% in 2012 
(Twenge et al., 2015). 
Monto and Grey (2014) analyzed data in the General Social Survey 
and found that respondents from the 2004–2012 wave did not report 
more sexual partners since age 18, more frequent sex, or more partners 
during the past year than respondents from the 1988–1996 wave. They 
also found ‘no evidence of substantial changes in sexual behavior that 
would indicate a new or pervasive pattern of non-relational sex among 
contemporary college students’ (p. 605). 
Education levels in the US increased consistently throughout the 
twentieth century – for instance, the percentage of the population with a 
college degree or higher increased from 3% in 1910 to 24% in 1998 – but 
again the trends are longstanding, with no noticeable change in the 
trend over recent decades. In particular, the gender balance of graduates 
has followed a long-term trend, with the percentage of bachelor degrees 
awarded to females increasing consistently from 19% in 1900 to 56% in 
2000, only interrupted by the Second world war. 
Leisure activities are continually changing and subject to fashion, but 
there is little evidence that the current period is in any way exceptional. 
Indeed, current trends in preferred leisure activities are relatively stable 
compared to the massive changes witnessed in the twentieth century as 
Americans embraced the new leisure technologies of movies, radio, the 
automobile, and television (Fischer, 1994). The Lynds, in their first 
Middletown study, noted how leisure activities had changed dramati-
cally between 1885 and 1925, which they attributed to ‘material de-
velopments such as the automobile and motion picture’ (Lynd and 
Lynd, 1929: 497). And despite Putnam’s (2000) assertion that social 
capital has been decreasing in the US since 1950, the stronger evidence 
presents a picture of stability rather than decline. For instance, Fischer 
(2011) inquired into the question of whether and how Americans’ 
relationship with family and friends changed between 1970 and 2010. 
The short answer, based on a canvass of published research and avail-
able survey data, is: not much. Some of the ways in which Americans 
engaged with people in their immediate circles changed, but the in-
timacy and support of close family and friendship ties stays about the 
same. (p. 94) 
More broadly, Ray’s (2002) detailed study indicates that civil society 
has been relatively stable, though flexible and dynamic, over much of 
the 20th century. 
Studies of internal migration are also revealing. For instance, in their 
historical study of internal migration in the United States, Molloy et al. 
(2011) conclude that, ‘Having trended upwards for much of the twen-
tieth century, “internal U.S. migration seems to have reached an in-
flection point around 1980…[as] migration rates have been falling in 
the past several decades’ (Molloy et al., 2011 p. 173–4). 
5.4. Religion 
Many influential writers of the 19th century, such as Comte, Spencer, 
Durkheim, Weber, Marx, and Freud, predicted that religion would 
gradually fade in importance with the emergence of industrial society. 
This may have been what happened in Europe, but it was hardly the case 
in the US where membership of a religious organization increased from 
41% of the population in 1906 to 70% in 1998. And while the hege-
monic position of the Christian churches declined somewhat in the 20th 
century – see Fig. 9– de Tocqueville’s comment, in 1835, that ‘there is no 
country in the whole world in which the Christian religion retains a 
greater influence over the souls of men than in America’ (Tocqueville, 
1835/2002: 334) might still hold true today. 
The Lynds, in their first Middletown study, concluded that, of the six 
dimensions they used to structure their inquiry, religious beliefs and 
practices changed the least between 1885 and 1925 (Lynd and Lynd, 
1929: 497). They opined that the town ‘values its religious beliefs in part 
because it is assured that they are unchanging’ (p. 403) at a time when 
‘changes proceed at accelerating speed in other sections of the city’s life’ 
(p. 406). However, they did discern that religious beliefs were not as 
dominant in 1924 as they were in the 1890s and that the tide had turned 
in the ‘direction of the “go-getter” rather than in that of “Blessed are the 
meek” of the church’ (p. 406). In their second study in 1935, they 
observed that secularization trend continuing and were somewhat sur-
prised that religion had not strengthened during the depression (Lynd 
and Lynd, 1937: 302). Instead, while religion continued to be an 
‘emotionally stabilizing agent’, other institutions increasingly provided 
leadership in defining values (p. 318). 
The 1977 Middletown study confirmed the long-term trend of 
secularization and also discerned a significant shift to religious rela-
tivism (Caplow et al., 2004). In 1924, 94% of high-school students 
agreed with the statement that ‘Christianity is the one true religion and 
all peoples should be converted to it’ but by 1977 that had dropped to 
41% (by 1999 it had increased marginally to 42%). Despite this religious 
relativism, ‘most students still affirmed the traditional Christian tenets 
of the divinity of Christ, the sacredness of the Bible, and the reality of life 
after death’ (Caplow et al., 2004: 294). 
This consistency of religious beliefs is also evident in Gallup polls. 
Between 1944 and 2011 over 90% of Gallup poll respondents said they 
believed in God, with the number only dropping slightly over the last 
decade to 87% in 2017 (see also Fig. 10). Similarly, the numbers praying 
to God outside of religious services did not change significantly between 
1990 and 2020 (Fig. 11). The number of respondents in Gallup polls 
claiming ‘No religion’ has steadily increased from 2% in 1948 to 21% in 
2019, but we are hardly seeing the sort of collapse in religious belief that 
might index a major change. 
Membership of the mainstream Protestant religions – Methodist, 
Presbyterian, Lutheran, Episcopal, and the United Church of Christ – 
declined during the century (5.5% of the US population was Methodist 
in 1900, compared to 3.1% in 1998), but membership of the more 
evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant religions increased (2.2% of 
the US population was Southern Baptist in 1900 compared to 5.9% in 
1998) showing that religious beliefs are perhaps becoming more 
polarized (Caplow et al., 2001: 109). Overall, however, the story of 
religion in the US over the last century is more about continuity than 
change (Carroll et al., 1979). 
5.5. Work 
Fig. 12 plots the inflation, unemployment and GDP annual growth 
rates, all of which are good indicators of economic turbulence and 
consequently social change (‘dismissal from work’ ranks eight on the 
Stress Scale). The graphs illustrate the profound economic turmoil of the 
first half of the twentieth century which saw two world wars, the stock 
market crash, a great depression, the Spanish flu as well as massive in-
dustrial change and restructuring. The first Middletown study shows 
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that turmoil had been ongoing since the late 19th century. The Lynds, 
who conducted the research, structured their study around six major 
groups of activities of which ‘getting a living’ ‘seemingly exhibits the 
most pervasive change, particularly in its technological and mechanical 
aspects’ (Lynd and Lynd, 1929: 497). In contrast to the first half of the 
twentieth century, the second half was much less turbulent and indeed 
the data shows that the most recent four decades have been relatively 
pacific. For instance, Fig. 12 graphically illustrates how much more 
turbulent the Great Depression of the 1930s was compared to the 
financial crash of 2008. 
A range of other macro-economic data indicates that the last five 
decades have been less turbulent that previous periods. For instance 
since the 1980s, there has been a consistent decline in job creation and 
destruction rates (Davis et al., 2012), the business startup rate (Decker 
et al., 2014), and job flows (Bjelland et al., 2011). 
Fig. 13 shows that the structure of the economy and the composition 
of the labor force changed radically over the past two centuries. The 
graph shows that the shift away from agriculture continued inexorably 
through both centuries and that by 1950 the shift to a ‘post-industrial’ 
society was well underway with the information sector accounting for 
over 30% of the labor force. 
Fig. 14 uses a different dataset and covers a different time period, but 
it presents a similar picture. The graph is taken from Elvery’s (2019) 
study of changes in the occupational structure of the United States from 
1860 to 2015 in which he concluded that ‘After 100 years of dramatic 
change, the mix of occupations has been more stable since 1970′ (p. 1). 
His analysis shows that ‘occupational mix has become increasingly sta-
ble since 1970, and the rate of change in occupational structure is now 
Fig. 9. Religious Preference.  
Fig. 10. Confidence in the existence of God.  
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low relative to that of most past decades. In fact, the degree of change in 
the occupational mix in recent years is less than half that seen in the 
decades with the most change, the 1900s and the 1940s’ (p. 1–2). 
Attitudes to women in the workforce changed considerably during 
the twentieth century from strong disapproval (82% in 1936) to equally 
strong approval (83% in 1996). In 1900, only 6% of married women 
worked but by 1998 it had increased to 61%. In the first half of the 
century, women worked mainly in domestic service, farming, or fac-
tories, but this shifted throughout the century. Initially, women found 
more employment in clerical and sales jobs and then, post-1950, in 
professional occupations (Caplow et al., 2001: 41–43). In 1950, 30% of 
the labor force were women; by 1990 this had increased to 45% but it 
has only marginally increased since then. 
5.6. Wealth 
Data on wealth distribution and income inequality supplies another 
useful indicator of social change. As Fig. 15 shows, there has been 
considerable change, over the past 100 years, in the share of pre-tax 
national income secured by the top 1% compared to the bottom 50%. 
There has been a clear trend since 1980, with the top 1% consistently 
and inexorably increasing their share, which is almost certainly due to 
the liberalization of the economy initiated during the Reagan years. 
Fig. 15 also graphs inequality in the US over time using the Gini index. A 
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 1 implies 
perfect inequality. As the graph clearly shows, by this measure 
inequality has been rising steadily over the last fifty years, suggesting 
that the gains from modest overall income growth have been concen-
trated within the wealthy. 
Fig. 11. How often do you pray to God outside of religious services?.  
Fig. 12. Inflation rate, unemployment rate, GDP Annual Growth rate.  
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Fig. 16 presents a picture of how earnings differ by race and how 
women’s earnings compare with men’s. In terms of race, the data shows 
that there has been no significant change over the last 40 years, with the 
improvement in the relative standing of ‘Asian’ labor market partici-
pants a notable exception. Women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s 
did increase between 1979 and 2005 but has flatlined since then. 
Public opinion is broadly against the idea of government interven-
tion to reduce income differentials and, as Fig. 17 shows, the public’s 
view on this has remained remarkably consistent over the last 40 years. 
The income differentials have not resulted in an increase in the 
membership or strength of labor unions. In the mid-1950s over 28% of 
the civilian labor force were in unions (up from 3% in 1900), but this 
number has steadily declined over the last 75 years. By 2000 only 13.5% 
of workers were in unions (and only 9% of workers in the private sector), 
while by 2019 the percentages had fallen to 10.3% and 6.2% (Caplow 
et al., 2001; US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). 
5.7. Law and order 
Fig. 18 plots the rate of homicides and incarcerations in the US since 
1900. The homicide rate rose rapidly from the mid-1960s but has 
dropped equally rapidly since 1990, though the US rate is still high 
compared to other countries in the Global North. In Gallup surveys, the 
number favoring the death penalty for murder mirrored the homicide 
Fig. 13. US Civilian labor force .  
Fig. 14. Occupational Group Employment Share by Year.  
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rate, rising from 45% in 1965 to 80% in 1994, but since then it has 
consistently declined and by 2020 it was just 55% (https://news.gallup. 
com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx). 
The US incarceration rate rose steeply after the mid-1970s but has 
been in decline since 2005 and is now at its lowest in two decades. One 
might expect the downward trend to continue as the US still has the 
highest incarceration rate in the world (World Prison Brief, 2020). 
The reasons why incarceration and homicide rates fluctuate are 
complex, as is their relationship with social change, but the current rates 
show that recent decades are unexceptional and may even be a period of 
relative calm, compared to earlier eras. 
The US political system has been a model of stability since the 
foundation of the state. The US constitution has been amended only 27 
times since it came into force in 1789 and only 12 times in the last 150 
years (the last amendment of real significance was the women’s suffrage 
amendment of 1920). The traditional two-party structure has continued 
Fig. 15. Share of pre-tax national income & Gini Coefficient.  
Fig. 16. Earnings by race as a percentage of median earnings and women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s.  
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over the same period (see Fig. 19), despite geographic shifts in support 
and the vicissitudes of political discourse. 
The US government has been getting bigger over the past 150 years. 
In 1831, President Jackson and 665 civilians ran the 3 branches of the 
US Federal Government, while 50 years later it had 13,000 civilian 
employees (Beniger, 1986:14). The trend continued up to the Second 
world war, but since then the size of the federal government, relative to 
population size, has declined slowly and has practically flatlined over 
the last two decades (Fig. 20). In contrast, the number of state and local 
government employees has continued to rise throughout the twentieth 
century, though the increase in recent decades has been small (Fig. 20). 
Once again, there is little evidence that the present period is exceptional. 
Finally, Fig. 21 shows that trust in a non-governmental authority – 
specifically, the scientific community – is virtually unchanged since the 
1970s. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has inquired into the question, ‘Are we living in a period 
of particularly rapid social change?’ In summarizing our answer to this 
question, we make the following five points. 
First, many of the words in the question – ‘we’, ‘period’, ‘particu-
larly’, ‘rapid’, ‘social change’ – are problematic and raise difficult 
epistemological and methodological issues that are likely to frustrate 
any attempt at arriving at a definitive answer. How and why people 
might feel they are living in a period of particularly pronounced change 
Fig. 17. Should Government Reduce Income Differences?.  
Fig. 18. Homicide and Incarceration rate in US per 100,000 people.  
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could have as much to do with socio-psychological phenomena as any 
changes in material circumstances. However, as we argued in the first 
part of the paper, this does not mean we should ignore the question or 
dismiss attempts to measure social change. 
Second, there is no doubt that we are living in a period of change, but 
so does every generation. For instance, Hout’s (2020) analysis of the 
General Social Survey dataset highlighted ‘the emergence of computers 
in American life and the coincident decline of newspaper reading, the 
growing acceptance of sexual diversity, a decline in some forms of racial 
prejudice against African Americans’ (p. 2) as important changes 
between 1972 and 2018. However, he also found ‘little change in sup-
port for collective action to undo racial disparities, the stalled gender 
revolution, and support for legalizing marijuana’ (ibid). Continuity and 
change are to be expected in any analysis, and indeed the absence of 
change would be a bizarre finding. Moreover, superficially similar 
events, such as ‘wars’ may invoke very different reactions at different 
points in time due to radically different contexts in which they unfold. 
However, the data we have marshaled in this paper – despite issues 
around the use of statistical data (measurement issues, selection criteria, 
data consistency, etc.) – provide little evidence supporting the thesis that 
Fig. 19. Party share in the US House of Representatives.  
Fig. 20. Federal / State & Local Employees per 100,000 population.  
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we are living in a period of exceptional or rapid social change relative to 
other historical periods. Many of the social changes we are now seeing 
are merely current manifestations of long-term trends stretching at least 
as far back as the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, if one was to reach 
any conclusion from the data it would be that there was more social 
change in the early and mid-twentieth century than between 1970 and 
2020. This finding runs against a popular assumption and assertion that 
we live in a period of unprecedented change. 
Third, we have deliberately avoided considering technological 
change in our analysis. We took this decision partly because an extensive 
literature on technological change already exists, and partly because to 
do so would raise methodological issues and necessarily appeal to some 
form of technological determinism. For instance, we can only speculate 
or engage in counterfactuals if we were to contrast the impact of the 
Internet with the range of breakthrough inventions that occurred during 
the period 1860–1900 (Gordon 2000b; Kavanagh et al., 2007). 
Fig. 21. Confidence in Scientific Community.  
Fig. 22. The word ‘secession’ in Google Trends.  
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Fourth, while our focus is on measuring social change rather than 
developing a model that might explain the phenomenon, none of the 
data indicates that social change occurs in long waves. If anything, the 
data would lean one towards a radical or punctuated equilibrium model 
of change, where a long period of relative stability is followed by an 
unexpected short period of rapid and revolutionary change (Gersick, 
1991; Gould, 2009). Revolutionary change is existential in nature and 
includes such events as insurrections, coups d’état, invasions by external 
actors, civil war, as well as profound constitutional changes such as 
moving from a monarchy to a republic, or from a democracy to a 
dictatorship, the break-up of a nation state, the merging of two nation 
states, etc. Examples include the collapse of communism, the break-up of 
the USSR, Brexit, and the reunification of Germany. While one can 
imagine and anticipate a revolutionary change, it is practically impos-
sible to predict when such a ‘black swan’ event will occur or what the 
subsequent world might look like (Taleb, 2007). All we can say is that 
there is nothing in our data indicating that the US is currently in such a 
period of revolutionary change or in the midst of an existential crisis. For 
instance, Fig. 22 shows that the word ‘secession’ has not featured in US 
discourse since at least 2004, save for a single blip in November 2012 
when, following Barack Obama’s re-election as US President, a series of 
online petitions were launched seeking the secession of various states. 
(The low threshold of 25,000 signatures was reached in only nine of the 
fifty states, while the official response from the White House was that 
secession was impossible because the Constitution had established a 
‘perpetual Union’ (Levinson, 2014).) Nonetheless, proponents of 
structural-demographic theory – whose models of human societies link 
political instability to fourteen attributes across three components (the 
general population, the elites and the state) – are pointing to evidence, 
such as the increase in anti-government demonstrations and riots, of 
growing instability in the United States (Turchin and Korotayev, 2020). 
Fifth, there is much scope for future research. A meaningful way of 
bringing together the various strands of data in one overall summary 
would clearly be revelatory but we found no way of achieving this, 
without leaving ourselves open to charges of inappropriately summing 
apples and oranges. A wealth of quantitative historical data is available 
for mining and analysis, and other indicators of social change may reveal 
a different picture, interesting patterns or intriguing relationships be-
tween constructs. To take but a few examples, we have paid no attention 
to phenomena such as the shifting prevalence of (illegal) drug con-
sumption, hours of work, linguistic competence and preference, etc. 
Moreover, there has also been an upsurge in recent years in new po-
tential indicators of social change, including a variety of what might be 
termed ‘social innovations’, which others could usefully examine to 
build upon our tentative opening here. Similar studies might also be 
conducted over other time periods or in other countries or regions. A 
Middletown V study would be timely and valuable, continuing the series 
of previous studies in 1924, 1935, 1988 and 1999. There is also potential 
for more research on what might constitute significant social change in 
the US and other contexts, the links between social and technological 
change, as well as theories of social change. There is also scope to 
consider the issue of causality, which we have avoided doing in this 
study. Finally, it is worth asking why – and to whose benefit – there is so 
much talk of us living in a period of rapid and unprecedented change 
when perhaps the truth is that others have lived in more interesting and 
eventful times. 
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marriages-and-divorces-1900–2012. 
1920–1995: from Carter et al. (2006) 
1996–2004: from the US Census Bureau (2007), with 2005-present 
data drawn from the Centers for Disease Control. 
Fertility Rates: 
Haines, Michael R. (1989) ’American Fertility in Transition: New 
Estimates of Birth Rates in the United States, 1900–1910′, Demography, 
26(1): 137–148. 
Haines, Michael R. (2006) ’Marriage and divorce rates: 1920–1995′, 
in S. B. Carter, S. S. Gartner, M. R. Haines, A. L. Olmstead, R. Sutch and 
G. Wright (eds.) Historical Statistics of the United States, Earliest Times to 
the Present: Millennial Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 
Table Ae507–513. 
Haines, Michael (2008) ‘Fertility and Mortality in the United States’, 
EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert Whaples. March 19. Available at: 
http://eh.net/encyclopedia/fertility-and-mortality-in-the-united-state 
s/ Accessed on 4 January 2021. 
Figure 9 Religious Preference 
https://news.gallup.com/poll/1690/religion.aspx, last consulted 
11th November 2020 
Figure 10. Confidence in the existence of God 
General Social Survey Data Explorer at gssdataexplorer.norc.org. 
Figure 11 How often do you pray to God outside of religious services? 
Same source as Fig. 9. 




“US City Average, All items” 
Unemployment Rate: 
Bureau of Labour Statistics: https://www.data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/surve 
ymost?bls 
"Top Picks," Select “Unemployment Rate,” Retrieve Data, ”Select 
1929–2020,” Select “Go.” Accessed Jan. 11, 2020 
1920 to 1929: from Stanley Lebergott, Manpower in Economic 
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Growth (New York, 1964). Lebergott’s estimates are the bases for the 
unemployment statistics reported in Historical Statistics of the United 
States: Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, D.C., 1976). 
GDP Annual Growth Rate: 
Bureau of Economic Analysis. “National Income and Product Ac-
counts Tables: Table 1.1.1 GDP Growth.” Accessed Jan. 11, 2020. 
GDP historical data: https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domesti 
c-product accessed 10 September 2020 
Figure 13. US Civilian labor force 
Beniger (1986: 23). See also Wyatt and Hecker (2006). 
Figure 14. Occupational Group Employment Share by Year 
Reproduced from Elvery (2019), Fig. 1. Elvery’s data came from the 
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) which contains decen-
nial census data from 1860 to 2000 and the American Community 
Surveys of 2005, 2010 and 2015 (Ruggles et al., 2020). We are grateful 
to Joel Elvery for providing us with this dataset. See Table 1 in his paper 
for more details on the occupation groupings. 
Figure 15. Share of pre-tax national income and Gini Coefficient 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-po 







1967–2019: Semega et al. (2020). See also https://www.census.go 
v/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-inco 
me-inequality.html 
1918–1966: Atkinson et al. (2017) Their numbers from 1918 to 1966 
have been increased by 6% to align their post-1967 data with Semega et 
al’s dataset (they adjusted their data to align with a 1944 dataset and to 
account for measurement changes). 
Figure 16. Earnings by race as a percentage of median earnings and 
women’s earnings as a percentage of men’s 
Bureau of Labour Statistics. https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/srgate 
Series: LEU0254466800, LEU0254898500, LEU0254468100, 
LEU0252881500, LEU0252883600, LEU0254468400, LEU0252885400 
Figure 17. Should Government Reduce Income Differences source: 
General Social Survey GSS 1972–2018 Cumulative Datafile https://sda. 
berkeley.edu/sdaweb/analysis/?dataset=gss18, last accessed 11th 
November 2019. 






Incarceration data from: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: 
U.S._incarceration_rates_1925_onwards.png Accessed 20 December 
2020. 
2015–2018: Bureau of Justice Statistics https://www.bjs.gov/nps 
/resources/documents/QT_imprisonment%20rate_total.xlsx 
Figure 19. Party share in the US House of Representatives 
Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present. US 
House of Representatives. History, Art & Archives. Available at: https 
://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ 
Accessed: 7 January 2021. 
Figure 20. Federal / State & Local Employees per 100,000 population 
Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years). 
1970–2010: 2012 (Table 496) 
1982–2009: 2012 (Table 461) 
US Bureau of the Census (1975) Historical statistics of the United States. 
Colonial times to 1970. US Department of Commerce. 
Figure 21. Confidence in Scientific Community 
Derived from General Social Survey GSS 1972–2018 Cumulative 
Datafile https://sda.berkeley.edu/sdaweb/analysis/?dataset=gss18, 
last consulted 11th November 2020. 
Figure 22. The word ‘secession’ in Google Trends 
Downloaded from Google Trends (https://trends.google.ie/t 
rends/explore?date=all&geo=US&q=secession#cmpt=q) on April 28, 
2021. 
Numbers in this figure represent search interest relative to the 
highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is 
the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is 
half as popular. 
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